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PUBLIC LAND LAW: PREEMPTION OF STATE
REGULATION OF MINERAL DEVELOPMENT
ON THE PUBLIC DOMAIN,
VENTURA COUNTY v. GULF OIL CORP.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has recognized a state's right to
regulate mineral development as a valid exercise of its police power1
and that the state's police power extends to the public domain.2 De-
spite these two propositions, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp. I held that a state4
cannot exercise its police power to regulate mineral development on the
public domain when the state regulations "impermissibly conflict"5
1. See, e.g., Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932); Ohio Oil Co.
v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900).
The police power, which is implicitly recognized in the tenth amendment to the Consti-
tution, entails the broad authority possessed by a sovereignty to legislate in furtherance
of the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of its citizenry ....
One of the strongest justifications for the state regulation in the energy area is public
safety .... Most energy-related regulations, however, are justified as promotive of the
general welare.
Mills and Woodson, Energy Policy: A Testfor Federalism, 18 ARIZ. L. REv. 405, 414-15 (1976)
(footnotes omitted). Another commentator elaborates:
In general, the constitutionality of state regulations for the conservation, production and
use of oil and gas has been supported on three grounds. They are that it is within the
police power of the state to enact and enforce legislation to protect the correlative rights
of owners of land within a common source of supply of oil and gas, to safeguard the
public interest in oil and gas as a natural resource of the state, and to prevent or abate
surface nuisances resulting from the operation of oil and gas wells.
Shapiro, Energy Development on the Public Domain: Federal/State Cooperation and Conflict Re-
garding Environmental Land Use Control, 9 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 397, 416 (1976) (footnote
omitted).
2. See, e.g., McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353 (1922); Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311
(1907); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Phillips Petro. Co., 277 F. Supp. 366 (W.D. Okla. 1967), aj'd,
406 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1969). Cf. Wallis v. Pan Am. Petro. Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966) (state law
governs the dealings of private parties who claim to have property interests in the public domain
when state law is sufficient to handle the dispute). But see notes 19-31 infra and accompanying
text.
3. 601 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1979), afdmem., 100 S. Ct. 1593 (1980).
4. While, Ventura involves a county regulation instead of a state regulation, this does not
matter "[s]ince local governments are political subdivisions of the state, [and] conflicts between
federal and local land use controls are simply federal/state conflicts and may be resolved under
the same principles . White and Barry, Energy Development in the West. Conflict and Coor-
dination of Governmental Decision-Making, 52 N.D. L. REv. 451, 506 (1976). For facility, Ventura
will be discussed in terms of a relationship between the federal and state governments.
5. 601 F.2d at 1082. See note 68 infra and accompanying text.
1
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with the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920.6 This note will examine
the Ventura decision. It is the thesis of this note that the Ventura court
erred in its holding because it is contrary to an explicit congressional
intent not to make the Mineral Leasing Act preemptive of state regula-
tion. Given the pressing energy problem in the United States, the Ven-
tura decision is significant because it greatly diminishes the police
power states once had to regulate the nation's energy resources.7
II. THE VENTURA FACTS
On April 1, 1974, Gulf Oil Corporation became the federal gov-
ernment's lessee of 120 acres located within the Los Padres National
Forest in the county of Ventura, California. Gulfs proposed oil explo-
ration and drilling activities were subject to extensive federal regula-
tion.8 Gulf began drilling on April 28, 1976. On May 5, 1976, Ventura
advised Gulf that the county's zoning ordinance prohibited oil explora-
tion and extraction until an Open Space Permit was obtained from the
county planning commission. The Open Space Use Permits are issued
with discretion and contain eleven mandatory conditions and any
number of additional conditions which the planning board may man-
date. Gulf decided to continue drilling operations without obtaining
the required permit.
Ventura petitioned the California Superior Court to order Gulf to
comply with Ventura's zoning ordinance. The case was removed to the
District Court for the Central District of California where Ventura
moved for a preliminary injunction. The District Court denied the in-
junction and dismissed the action. Ventura unsuccessfully appealed to
6. 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1971). The Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920 is popularly known as
the Mineral Leasing Act. Even though, technically, it is improper to refer categorically to all land
covered by the act as the public domain, public lands, or federal lands, these terms are employed
interchangeably thoroughout the text of this article to mean those lands covered by the Act, unless
noted otherwise.
7. For another note discussing Ventura see Note, State andLocal Control of Energy Develop-
ment on Federal Lands, 32 STAN. L. REv. 373 (1980).
8. First, the land was leased by the Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Manage-
ment, and assigned to Gulf for oil exploration and development pursuant to the Mineral Leasing
Act. "The basic lease.. . contains approximately 45 paragraphs including requirements of dili-
gence and protection of the environment .... " 601 F.2d at 1083. Because the leased land lies
within a National Forest, Gulf's activity was also subjected to Department of Agriculture condi-
tions and permit approval. Finally, Gulf also obtained a required drilling permit from the De-
partment of the Interior, Geological Survey. The Geological Survey, which follows the guidelines
of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976), subjected Gulf's lease
to ten more conditions. In addition to acquiring required federal permits, Gulf obtained approval
from the California Resources Agency, Division of Oil and Gas. Thus, while Gulf had both
federal and state approval, it had not obtained county approval.
[Vol. 16:317
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both the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit,9 and the
United States Supreme Court.'
III. VENTURA ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit, in Ventura, defined a five-way relationship be-
tween the property clause," the supremacy clause, 2 the state's police
power, the Mineral Leasing Act, and the preemption doctrine. This
note will analyze the court's view of that relationship by examining
each of the three interrelated major issues. They are:
(1) whether, in enacting the Mineral Leasing Act, Congress
had thepower to preempt state police power regulation
of mineral development on the federal public domain;
(2) whether, in enacting the Mineral Leasing Act, Congress
had the intent to preempt state police power regulation
of mineral development on the federal public domain;
and
(3) whether the Mineral Leasing Act can preempt a state
from using its police power to regulate mineral develop-
ment on the federal public domain.
The third issue makes Ventura most notable. Theoretically, that
issue cannot be resolved until it is determined whether Congress had
both the power and intent to preempt a state's police power.' 3 The
power to preempt is worthless unless there is an accompanying intent
to invoke that power to preempt.' 4 The reverse is also true. 5 There-
9. 601 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1979).
10. 100 S. Ct. 1593 (1980).
11. U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 3, cl. 2. The property clause reads: "The Congress shall have Power
to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Prop-
erty belonging to the United States ...." For a discussion of the property clause see, Engdahl,
Symposium, Federalism and Energy: State and Federal Power over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ. L.
REV. 283 (1976); Landstorm, State and Local Governmental Regulation of Private Land Using Ac-
tivities on Federal Lands, 7 NAT. RFSOURCES LAW. 77, 77-80 (1974); Hubbard, The Application of
State Conservation Laws to Oil and Gas Operations on the Public Domain, 32 ROCKY MTN. L. REV.
109, 263-67 (1960).
12. U.S. CONsT. art. 6, cl. 2. The supremacy clause reads: "the Laws of the United States
... shall be the supreme Law of the Land... Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstand-
ing." The supremacy clause makes a law enacted pursuant to an enumerated power the control-
ling law. MeCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637
(1971).
13. See generally Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of Federal Power, 45 U. COLO. L. REv. 51
(1973).
14. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); First Iowa Hydro-
Electric Coop. v. Federal Power Comm., 328 U.S. 152 (1946). See generally Engdahl, supra note
13.
15. Id
1980]
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fore before a court can find that the Mineral Leasing Act has preemp-
tive capability 16 it would first have to find the necessary congressional
power and intent. Once the court finds this preemptive capability it
must next determine whether Ventura's regulations are preempted
since the preemption doctrine only operates where there is conflict.' 7
A. Preemptive Power. The Weighing of the Property and Supremacy
Clauses Against the State's Police Power
The Constitution's property clause, coupled with the supremacy
clause, granted Congress preemptive power in Ventura. The Ninth
Circuit, relying heavily on Kleppe v. New Mexico,'" held that the Min-
eral Leasing Act was a valid enactment under the property clause based
on Kleppe's ruling that the property clause grants the federal govern-
ment unlimited power to regulate federal property.' 9 In 1976 the
United States Supreme Court held in Kleppe that the New Mexico Es-
tray Law,2" which allowed state authorities to round up and manage
stray burros and horses, was preempted by the federal Wild Free-
Roaming Horses and Burros Act "which was passed . . . to protect
wild horses and burros on the public lands of the United States."' 2' The
Ventura court agreed with Kleppe that:
Absent consent or cession a State, undoubtedly retains juris-
diction over federal lands within its territory, but Congress
equally surely retains the power to enact legislation respecting
those lands pursuant to the Property Clause. And when Con-
gress so acts, the federal legislation necessarily overrides con-
flicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause . . . . A
different rule would place the public domain of the United
States completely at the mercy of state legislation.2"
Ventura agreed with Kleppe that the property clause power is "without
limitations." 3
16. Preemptive capability is simply the ability to preempt. See generally Engdahl, supra note
13; notes 64-78 infra and accompanying text.
17. See notes 68-82 infra and accompanying text. Logically, the court's finding that the Min-
eral Leasing Act has preemptive capability is not determinative of another issue-whether the
Mineral Leasing Act in a particular case operates to preempt a state from using its police power to
regulate mineral development on the federal public domain. However, the Ventura opinion does
not reflect an explicit delineation between that issue and the third issue.
18. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
19. Id. at 542-43.
20. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 77-13-I to -13-10 (1978).
21. 601 F.2d at 1083.
22. Id
23. Id
[Vol. 16:317
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Ventura is also in accord with Kleppe that the property clause
grants Congress significant legislative power over federal land. How-
ever, the question should not be whether the court misused or misinter-
preted Kleppe,24 but rather, whether Kleppe itself was justified. One
commentator suggests that every case cited in Kleppe was either "mis-
construed or misapplied"25 and that "the Supreme Court for the first
time in its history adopted as its ground of decision a proposition con-
tradictory to the cardinal thesis of the classic article IV property clause
doctrine. 26
1. The Pro-federal Property Clause Series
Kleppe was not the first case in which the Supreme Court broadly
interpreted the property clause in favor of the federal government.
Utah Power and Light Co. v. United States,27 a 1916 case on which
Kleppe relied, was one of the most notable cases in which the Court
advocated significant federal power over federal lands pursuant to the
property clause.21 In Utah Power and Light, the defendant public util-
ity company occupied lands in forest reservations in Utah by building
dams, reservoirs, and other structures necessary to generate electrical
power. This occupation was without the permission of the United
States as required by a federal act.29 The issue presented was whether
the federal government had legal control over land located within
Utah's borders. In an affirmative response the Court stated "that the
inclusions within a State of lands of the United States does not take
from Congress the power to control their occupancy and use. . and
to prescribe the conditions upon which others can obtain rights in
them."30 Again, the judicial source of this power was the property
clause.
Though Utah Power and Light is the most notable case prior to
Kleppe, the pro-federal power argument was made as early as 1871 in
Gibson v. Chouteau.31 In Gibson, the Court held that a state's statute of
24. In abstract terms, the Mineral Leasing Act does what the federal Wild Free-Roaming
Horses and Burros Act does. Both acts regulate activity on federal land in subject matter where
the states have traditionally exercised their police powers.
25. Engdahl, supra note 11, at 351.
26. Id at 349.
27. 243 U.S. 389 (1916).
28. See note 30 infra and accompanying text.
29. Act of May 14, 1896, ch. 179, § 4944, 29 Stat. 120.
30. 243 U.S. 389, 405 (1916).
31. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92 (1871). Other cases in the series include United States v. San Fran-
1980]
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limitations, coupled with the doctrine of relation,32 cannot be used to
affect ownership rights obtained by a private party under a federal con-
veyance of public land. The significance of Gibson is displayed by its
reasoning and view that the property clause grants Congress power to
dispose of and regulate the public domain without limitation and can-
not be undermined by state legislation.33
2. The Pro-state Property Clause Series
There is a second line of cases advocating a contrary viewpoint on
the amount of federal power emanating from the property clause. This
line of cases originated in 1845 with Pollard v. Hagan.34 The United
States Supreme Court in Pollard stated that the federal government lost
its power over public lands within Alabama once Alabama had become
a state because to allow federal control over that land would have put
Alabama on a different footing than the original states.35 The federal
government retained no dispositive power over public land within
other states and thus, the Court reasoned that it would be unfair to
treat Alabama differently.36 This equal footing doctrine provides the
justification for all the cases in the pro-state power series. Pollard is not
mentioned in Kleppe, but, Kleppe discusses several cases which fol-
lowed Pollard. In its discussion of those cases Kleppe strictly limited
their holdings.37
cisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940), and Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928). The Court in Kleppe
relied upon Gibson.
32. The doctrine of relation is often called the relation back doctrine. Under this fiction an
act or event, such as the transfer of title to real property, is treated as if it had occurred earlier.
33. 80 U.S. 13 Wall. at 99-100.
34. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 391 (1844). See, also, Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907); Ward v.
Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896).
35. 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 401-07.
36. Id
37. For example, the Court in Kleppe dismissed Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228 (1925) by
stating that in that case "the Court found that Congress had not purported to assume jurisdiction
over highways within the Rocky Mountain National Park, not that it lacked the power to do so
under the Property Clause." 426 U.S. at 544. However, the Court in Kleppe neglected to point out
that the Court in Colorado v. Toll indicated that had the Congressional act not given the state
power over the park the Court would have had to decide whether Colorado had ceded its power
over that property to the federal government since the United States Government can only get
exclusive jurisdiction over the public lands if the state ceded that jurisdiction. 268 U.S. at 230.
Kleppe also dismissed Wilson v. Cook, 327 U.S. 474 (1945), which held that
Upon admission of Arkansas to statehood in 1836 upon an equal footing with the
original states (Act of June 15, 1836, c. 100, 5 Stat. 50), the legislative authority of the
state extended over the federally owned lands within the state, to the same extent as over
similar property held by private owners, save that the state could enact no law which
would conflict with the powers reserved to the United States. . . [through consent of the
state or cession of the jurisdiction by the state].
[Vol. 16:317
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3. Summary
The Kleppe court attempted to avoid the inevitable conclusion that
the two series of cases are irreconcilable.38 Kleppe was not an attempt
to advance a new proposition. Had the Court in Kleppe decided in
favor of New Mexico it would have had the total support of the pro-
state power series.3 9
Kleppe should have addressed the question of which line of cases
is correct. To answer this question the Court would need to go beyond
mere policy arguments and examine the constitutionality of each line
of cases.40 Without a probe into the constitutional foundation of the
property clause the two pronged series remains at a standstill.
B. Preemptive Intent: Congressional Intent Behind the Mineral
Leasing Act
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found preemptive intent in
the Mineral Leasing Act despite Ventura's opposing contentions. Ven-
tura argued that two clauses in the Mineral Leasing Act provide ex-
plicit evidence of a nonpreemptive intent. First, Ventura asserted no
preemptive intent based on a savings clause in section 187. It was ar-
gued that section provides for state regulation of mineral development
without preemption by the Mineral Leasing Act.4 The court re-
Id at 487. Kleppe dismissed Wilson because, unlike Kleppe, there was no federal statute involved.
426 U.S. at 544. However, Wilson defines the limitations of federal power over the public domain
which is why Kleppe is significant.
For a discussion of the cases relied upon by the Supreme Court in Kleppe see EngdahL supra
note 11, at 351-58.
38. However, there are other cases which fall between the two extremes. The rule advanced
in those cases is that a state can exercise its police power over the public domain, at least when
there is no federal legislation on the subject. Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918). See,
also McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353 (1922); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Phillips Petro.
Co., 277 F. Supp. 366 (W.D. Okla. 1967), affd, 406 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1969).
39. See notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text.
40. See notes 22 and 35-36 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of policy argu-
ments.
41. Section 187 reads in full:
No lease issued under the authority of this chapter shall be assigned or sublet, ex-
cept with the consent of the Secretary of the Interior. The lessee may, in the discretion of
the Secretary of the Interior, be permitted at any time to make written relinquishment of
all rights under such a lease, and upon acceptance thereof be thereby relieved of all
future obligations under said lease, and may with like consent surrender any legal subdi-
vision of the area included within the lease. Each lease shall contain provisions for the
purpose of insuring the exercise of reasonable diligence, skill, and care in the operation
of said property; a provision that such rules for the safety and welfare of the miners and
for the prevention of undue waste as may be prescribed by said Secretary shall be ob-
served, including a restriction of the workday to not exceeding eight hours in any one
day for underground workers except in cases of emergency; provisions prohibiting the
7
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sponded to Ventura's contention by stating that the savings clause in
section 187
relates only to the provisions of the preceding sentence. These
provisions relate to employment practices, prevention of un-
due waste and monopoly, and diligence requirements. [The
provisions which Ventura argues should be protected by the
savings clause are land use controls and] [t]here is no mention
of land use controls. Moreover, the proviso assures only that
the Secretary of the Interior shall observe state standards in
drafting the lease's terms. It is not a recognition of concurrent
state jurisdiction.42
Next, the court rejected Ventura's contention that a second pro-
viso, in section 189, prevents state law from being undermined. Section
189 of the Mineral Leasing Act provides that:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed or held to affect the
rights of the states or other local authority to exercise any
rights which they may have, including the right to levy and
collect taxes upon improvements, output of mines or other
rights, property, or assets of any lessee of the United States.43
The court stated that "the proviso cannot give authority to the state
which it does not already possess."" and concluded that under the
Mineral Leasing Act a state does not have the authority to impose
stricter standards on government lessees than those imposed by the fed-
employment of any child under the age of sixteen in any mine below the surface; provi-
sions securing the workmen complete freedom of purchase; provision requiring the pay-
ment of wages at least twice a month in lawful money of the United States, and
providing proper rules and regulations to insure the fair and just weighing or measure-
ment of the coal mined by each miner, and such other provisions as he may deem neces-
sary to insure the sale of the production of such leased lands to the United States and to
the public at reasonable prices, for the protection of the interests of the United States, for
the prevention of monopoly, and for the safeguarding of the public welfare. None of such
provisions shall be in conflict with the laws of the State in which the leased property is
situated.
30 U.S.C. § 187 (Supp. 1980) (emphasis added). The functions of the Secretary of the Interior
have been transferred to the Secretary of Energy by the Department of Energy Organization Act
of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91; 91 Stat. 565 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7152(b)).
42. 601 F.2d at 1085.
43. Section 189 reads in full:
The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to prescribe necessary and proper rules
and regulations and to do any and all things necessary to carry out and accomplish the
purposes of this chapter, also to fix and determine the boundary lines of any structure, or
oil or gas field, for the purposes of this chapter. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed
or held to affect the rights of the States or other local authority to exercise any rights which
they may have, including theright to levy and collect taxes upon improvements, output of
mines, or other rights, property, or assets of any lessee of the United States.
30 U.S.C. § 189 (Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
44. 601 F.2d at 1086.
[Vol. 16:317
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eral government.45
The court's holding on the issue of preemptive intent is marked by
circular reasoning and an incomplete analysis. Congressional history
clearly shows that both sections 187 and 189 were not intended to pre-
empt state regulation of mineral development.46
1. Section 187
In the brief discussion of section 18747 the Ninth Circuit reasoned
that even if the proviso in section 187 is a savings clause, it refers only
to the immediately preceding provisions of section 187 which do not
mention land use planning controls, such as the Ventura regulations.
This reasoning can be analyzed along three lines.
First, assuming that the savings clause is limited to the immediate
preceding provisions, it is arguable that the specific provisions to which
the savings clause refers are similar enough to land use control provi-
sions so that state power over federal land should not be undermined
merely because the exact words "land use control" do not appear in the
statute.48
Second, the court's holding was not in accord with other cases49
which have examined congressional preemptive intent under the Min-
eral Leasing Act.50 The Tenth Circuit, in Texas Oil and Gas Corp. v.
Phillos Petroluem Co., t discusses both sections 187 and 189, but the
Ventura court ignored that court's discussion of section 187. Texas Oil
held that the language of section 187 "leave[s] to the States the power
to exercise state police power over Federal oil and gas leases."52 Rely-
ing on the language of section 187, Texas Oil upheld Oklahoma's right
45. Id
46. See notes 50-51 and 59-62 infra and accompanying text.
47. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
48. One commentator stated:
[T]here is the. . . problem of determining the proper interpretation of a general saving
clause .... The court must begin its analysis of a general saving clause by recognizing
that Congress is not able to anticipate all of the preemptive problems which may arise in
the broad field covered by the clause. Accordingly, the court should infer that a literal
application of the clause would not serve the statutory purpose.
Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515, 540-41.
49. See notes 51-52, 58 infra and accompanying text.
50. As will be shown, the cases do not conflict with congressional intent as ascertained from a
debate in the House of Representatives.
51. 277 F. Supp. 366 (W.D. Okla. 1967), af'd, 406 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1969). This is the
only case in which a federal court discusses congressional intent behind the specific language
being scrutinized in § 187.
52. 277 F. Supp. at 369..4ccord, Wallis v. Pan Am. Petro. Corp., 384 US. 63 (1966). While
not discussing § 187 specifically, Wallis may be read to hold that state law regulating mineral
1980]
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to use its police power to order forced pooling on the public domain. 3
Texas Oil supports Ventura's contention that the savings clause in sec-
tion 187 is not restricted to the provisions in the immediately preceding
sentence which relate to diligence, skill, care, safety, welfare require-
ments, employment practices, and the prevention of monopolies.
Third, the Ventura court failed to note that sections 187 and 189
are contained within the section of the Mineral Leasing Act devoted to
"General Provisions". A reasonable inference may be drawn that the
content of such a section is likely to be broad in scope and generally
relate to all other sections of the act, unless otherwise indicated by un-
ambiguous terms. This is just one additional factor which the court
should have considerd before it reached its conclusions on preemptive
treatment.
The lack of preemptive intent is readily apparent from congres-
sional hearings. Debate indicates that Congress did not intend the
Mineral Leasing Act to have preemptive effect on state legislation. The
following are excerpts from a debate which preceded an unsuccessful
motion to delete the savings clause from section 187:
Representative Mondell: [The] intent [of the proviso in
§187], I assume, is to prevent the Federal Government
from putting in these leases any provision which would
be contrary to the salutary provisions of State laws, and if
that language is striken out it would be possible for the
Secretary of the Interior to insert conditions in the lease
of a character that flew squarely in the face of the most
necessary, essential, and salutary provisions of the laws
of the States.
Evans: The United States, by the terms of the lease that is to
be made under this provision, is empowered and author-
ized to put into that lease provisions which [for example,]
make the safety of the people paramount; not that the
State shall not make those laws still stronger, but that it
shall not make them less so.
If the State makes a law which is stronger than the provi-
sion which the Secretary of the Interior incorporates into the
development may be superior to federal regulation even though "the leases are issued by the
United States and concern Federal Lands." Id at 70-71.
53. The court also relied on the language of § 189; see text accompanying note 57 infra.
[Vol. 16:317
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lease, that law will apply.54
All the congressmen who expressed views on the preemptive effect
of the savings clause in section 187 agreed that stricter state laws would
not be preempted by the Mineral Leasing Act." With this premise,
and since Ventura's regulations are stricter in that they require the
lessee to meet at least eleven mandatory conditions not imposed by the
Mineral Leasing Act, the Ventura court should have held that the
stricter Ventura regulations are not preempted by the federal regula-
tions.
2. Section 189
The court did not logically present its reasoning on the effect of
section 189. It stated that section 189 of the Mineral Leasing Act "can-
not give authority to the state which it does not already possess. 56
Next, the court concluded that section 189 does not undermine any fed-
eral power to preempt state regulation. There was no explanation why
the language of section 189, alleged by Ventura to be a broad savings
clause, was not so broad. While the court noted that section 189 "is an
express recognition of the right of the states to tax activities of the Gov-
ernment's lessee pursuant to its lease. . . and has been relied upon in
part to uphold [state promulgated] forced pooling and well spacing of
federal mineral lessee operations . . .,15 it never explained why the
right to regulate mineral development was not included as a right
which a state has and therefore protected by the savings clause in sec-
tion 189.
Ventura County's argument is supported by a 1925 United States
Supreme Court decision which interpreted section 189. The Court in
54. 58 CONG. REC. 7644.45 (1919). This is the only notable source discussing §§ 187 and 189.
55. 58 CONG. REC. 7643-45 (1919). Federal regulations (here) include specific provisions in
the Mineral Leasing Act and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior. All of the
congressmen, except one, agreed further that state laws contrary to the federal act preempt the
federal act. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 428 ([A]s between federal and state conservation require-
ments for the public domain, the more stringent ones would apply.) and 439 ([S]tate requirements
[which are more stringent than federal requirements] may be enforced when compatible with fed-
eral energy development goals.).
56. 601 F.2d at 1086.
57. Id The Ventura court cited Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949)
for the first proposition. However, reliance on this on this case is questionable since the Mineral
Leasing Act was not the federal mineral act involved. A case on which the court should have
relied is Mid-Northern Oil Co. v. Montana, 268 U.S. 45 (1925). The case referred to for the other
propositions is Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Phillips Petro. Co., 277 F. Supp. 366 (W.D. Okla. 1967),
ai'd, 406 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1969).
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Mid-Northern Oil Co. v. Montana5 8 upheld a state license tax on all
mineral producing lands within the state's borders. The Court stated
"we find nothing in the body of the act which, by any stretch of mean-
ing, purports to detract from or render less certain any such preexisting
rights; and, in that view, the theory [that "existing rights" means laws
enacted prior to the Act's passage] ...fails for want of material on
which to operate. '5 9 Existing rights, then, are those powers which have
been allocated to the states under the Constitution. "Existing rights"
are not synonymous with state laws enacted before the Mineral Leasing
Act.
There seems to be only two possible reasons why the Ventura court
found that the right to regulate mineral development on federal land
was not a right protected by the savings clause in section 189. These
reasons are that the court did not classify Ventura's regulations as "ex-
isting rights" within the meaning of section 189 and thus they did not
merit protection, or alternatively, that the court construed section 189
as limited to the protection of tax regulations only. If the reason was
the former, then according to the Supreme Court in Mid-Northern, the
Ventura contention concerning section 189 must fail. Since a state al-
ways had the police power to regulate mineral development6 ° Ventura's
police power was an existing right within the meaning of section 189.
In the alternative, if the Ninth Circuit's unstated reason why Ven-
tura cannot regulate mineral development on federal land is because
Ventura's regulation is not a tax regulation, then the court failed to
explain how it could confine section 189 only to the right to tax, espe-
cially when the court pointed out that the clause was used in Texas Oil
to uphold state forced pooling regulations which are unrelated to tax-
ing.6' Moreover, the Supreme Court in Mid-Northern never limited the
"rights" to only taxation rights.62
Congressional discussion of section 189 is helpful in deriving legis-
lative intent. Shortly after the House of Representatives defeated the
proposed deletion of the savings clause of section 187,63 it was pro-
posed that the savings clause language of section 18961 be deleted. The
debate, which led to another defeated amendment, concerned taxation
58. 268 U.S. 45 (1925).
59. Id at 48.
60. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
61. 601 F.2d at 1086. Compare this discussion with Hubbard, supra note 11, at 272-77.
62. 268 U.S. 45, 48 (1925).
-63. 58 CONG. REC. 7643-45 (1919).
64. See text accompanying note 43 supra for the controversial provision.
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rights only. It can be inferred from this discussion that Mid-Northern's
definition of "existing rights" is an accurate interpretation of Congres-
sional intent.65 Moreover, a conference report reveals that the savings
clause in section 189 had been specifically amended so that its scope
would not be limited to state tax regulations.66 In summation, based
both on case law and legislative history, the savings clauses in sections
187 and 189 should have operated to Ventura's benefit.67
C. The Preemptive Capability of the Mineral Leasing Act
Once the court determined Congress had preemptive intent in
passing the Mineral Leasing Act it became necessary to determine what
would trigger its preemptive capability.68 Merely because there are
both federal and state regulations of mineral development on the pub-
lic domain does not mean the state regulations are preempted.69 The
following analysis examines how this preemptive capability is trig-
gered.
Preemption, basically, is the unenforceability of one law because it
is contrary to another law. 70 This is one of the many ways the word has
been defined.7' No single test has been used consistently to define the
65. See 58 CONG. REc. 7646-47 (1919).
66. CONFERENCE REP. on S. 2812, H.R. REP. No. 1138, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 16 (1919). This
is found also in H.R. REP. No. 1059, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 18 (1919). The phrase includingthe right
was inserted into the original proposal so that the savings clause in § 189 today reads:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed or held to affect the rights of the States or
other local authority to exercise any rights which they may have, including the right to
levy and collect taxes ...
67. According to the foregoing analysis, either clause would have been sufficient to protect
Ventura's interest. The two provisos differ only to the extent that § 187, according to its language,
is aimed at protecting state laws whereas § 189 protects state rights.
It is interesting how the court read the savings clauses in §§ 187 and 189 since many commen-
tators who have discussed either or both of the provisions did not see the limitations found by the
court in Ventura. See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 11 at 267-80 "Congress did not, by passing the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, intend to prevent the states from applying their own conservation
laws to operations on the public domain. ... Id at 275; Shapiro, supra note 1, at 416-18, 426-
33 "ITihe Mineral Leasing Act explicitly preserves the police power authority of the states." Id at
427; 5 Public Land Law Review Commission, Energy Fuel Mineral Resources of the Public Lands,
274-77 (revised ed. 1970). "[N]o lease conditions shall conffict with state laws. . ." Id at 277.
68. The preemption doctrine has been discussed in numerous articles. It is too complex to
discuss in depth in this note. See generally, Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives
on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975); Engdahl, supra note 13;
Hirsch, supra note 48; Note, Federal Preemption of State Laws: The Effect of.Regulatory Agency
Attitudes on Judicial Decisionmaking, 50 IND. L.J. 848 (1975).
69. Cf. Askew v. American Waterway Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973) (Federal Water
Quality Improvement Act does not preempt a Florida oil spill act); Huron Portland Cement Co. v.
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (see text accompanying notes 77-80 infra).
70. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 48, at 516.
71. See note 68 supra and note 72 infra and accompanying text.
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term. "Over the years the court has generated a variety of expressions
which it has used as tests of preemption: 'conflicting; contrary to; occu-
pying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency;
violation; curtailment; and interference.' ,72 Ventura utilized the "im-
permissible conflict" test73 and found impermissible conflict because of
extensive federal regulation74 and because the Ventura-federal govern-
ment clash involved a vertical power struggle.75 The court's reasoning
is weak because extensive federal regulation does not necessarily mean
there is conflict. 76 The reasoning appears circular because the power
struggle would terminate once the court determines whether the Min-
eral Leasing Act can preempt state regulation. Ventura never explicitly
defined "impermissible conflict."
Ventura County argued that Huron Portland Cement Co. v. De-
troit 77 held that what Gulf considered to be a conflict was, in fact, not a
conflict. In Huron Portland Cement a local ordinance, aimed at elimi-
nating air pollution, prevented a federally licensed ship from travelling
in interstate commerce. The federal statute, which permitted the ship
to travel, was aimed at the seaworthiness of the vessel and thus, the
purposes of the two laws did not conflict. The United States Supreme
Court in Huron Portland Cement concluded that since there was no
"overlap. . . [in purpose, that to find conflict] would be to ignore the
teaching of this Court's decisions which enjoin seeking out conflicts be-
tween state and federal regulation where none clearly exists." 7 8 It ap-
pears that the Huron court placed itself in Congress' position to
determine if Congress would have wanted the local regulation to yield
to the federal statute had Congress thought about that possibility
before it enacted the legislation.79 In this light, Ventura's contention
that there was no conflict would be correct since legislative history
72. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
73. 601 F.2d at 1082.
74. Id at 1083-84.
75. Id
76. See, eg., Askew v. American Waterway Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973); Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
77. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
78. 1d at 446. Compare Huron Portland Cement with Kesler v. Department of Public Safety,
369 U.S. 153 (1962). But see Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) ("The test. . . is. .. not whether [the acts] . . are
aimed at similiar or different objectives." Id at 142.).
79. "Questions of the relation of the federal law to existing and potential state laws are sel-
dom considered in detail in the drafting of legislation. Consequently, many federal acts are
adopted without serious consideration of their impact on state laws dealing directly with the same
subject matter." Hirsch, supra note 48, at 542.
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reveals that Congress did not intend for the Mineral Leasing Act to
preempt state legislation.8 0
Ventura's definition of preemption is that a federal act preempts a
state act only when the state act "stand[s] as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress."' This proposition restates the rule that a court should follow
congressional intent when determining if there is preemption. Thus,
preemptive capability can only be triggered into preemption when con-
gressional intent, either explicit or implicit, can be found in statutory
language or is ascertainable from legislative history.8 2
IV. THE EXTENT OF PREEMPTIVE CAPABILITY UNDER THE
MINERAL LEASING ACT
The Ninth Circuit interpreted the Mineral Leasing Act to possess
extensive preemptive capability. The court held that the Mineral Leas-
ing Act will preempt state regulation of mineral development on the
public domain whenever a state regulation imposes stricter standards
than those imposed by the Mineral Leasing Act. Therefore, the court
found that in the Ventura fact pattern, where state law is stricter than
federal law, the Mineral Leasing Act will preempt state law. It is possi-
ble that a state regulation, though not contrary to any provision of the
Mineral Leasing Act, may be construed as a stricter state requirement if
it imposes an additional standard which the lessee must meet. Thus,
Ventura may also stand for the proposition that the Mineral Leasing
Act prohibits a state from extending any mineral regulations to the
public domain. 3
Although Ventura marks the first time the Supreme Court has
passed judgment on the savings clauses of both sections 187 and 189,
the central issue presented in Ventura has been examined by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, 4 commentators,8 5 agencies,8 6 and govern-
80. See notes 54-55, 63-66 supra and accompanying text.
81. 601 F.2d at 1086.
82. See Note, supra note 68. "The clear intent requirement for occupation found a correla-
tive in the actual conflict standard." Id. at 627 (footnote omitted); Engdahl, supra note 13, at 52-
55.
83. A state might promulgate mineral development legislation with the intent that it will be
applicable to all land within its borders. However, the law established in Ventura would prevent
the applicability of that legislation to any public domain located within the state.
84. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Phillips Petro. Co., 277 F. Supp. 366 (W.D. Okla. 1967), af 'd,
406 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1969).
85. See notes 1, 55 supra.
86. In a Colorado case (similar to Ventura) the Department of the Interior said that "county
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mental administrators.8 7 Most conclusions are similar to the one in this
note that the savings clauses in sections 187 and 189 protect state min-
eral regulations from preemption. According to the Tenth Circuit, in
Texas Oil,"8 the only two powers of the Mineral Leasing Act, which
cannot be undermined by state law, are, that (1) "a federal mineral
lessee may not assign his lease without the consent of the Federal Gov-
ernment '8 9 and (2) "a pooling or communitization agreement involv-
ing federal and non-federal lands must be approved by the Federal
Government." 90
The holding in Ventura should have been that, under the Mineral
Leasing Act, the federal government can only fill in the gaps left open
by state regulation and that stricter state regulative standards will pre-
vail over more lenient federal standards.
V. CONCLUSION
The Ventura decision illuminates a false congressional intent re-
specting the Mineral Leasing Act. The decision reflects the judiciary's
failure to scrutinize the constitutional bases for the two series of prop-
erty clause cases in order to end the existing dichotomy. Ventura is
notable for several reasons. It is most significant because it grants the
federal government both the power over and responsibility of the de-
velopment of mineral resources on the public domain. Nearly one
zoning was not 'applicable' to federal lands and would, as a result, have no effect on the lessees'
activities."
However, another federal agency, the Office of Technology Assessment took an opposite
view. It stated that, "The legislative history of [sections 187 and 1891 clearly indicates congres-
sional intent to let state police power govern the operations of federal mineral lessees, even to the
extent of overriding contrary regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior." Note,
Slate and Local Energy Development, supra note 7, at 378-79 n.40.
87. Two exceptions to this lack of legal opinion concerning state jurisdiction over federal
lands are two Attorney Genreal's opinions, one from Wyoming [[1941-47] OPINIONS OF
Wyo. ATTY GEN 9791, and one from New Mexico [[1935-361 REP. OF N.M. Arr'Y GEN.
75, No. II10]. The Wyoming opinion seems to conclude that the right to regulate for
conservation purposes is clearly in the states, although some of the language indicates
this conclusion would have been made with more hesitation if a federal statute or regula-
tion concerning specific subject matter of the inquiry had been found. The New Mexico
opinion indicates that even more caution was warranted, however, due to certain provi-
sions of the Federal Mineral Leasing act.
Hubbard, supra note 11, at 126-27 (footnotes omitted).
In an opinion by the Attorney General, 152 Op. Ouxo ATreY GEN. at 23 (1951), "[it was held
... that the State could not require a license or payment of a licensing fee for mining on the
Federal land." Landstrom, supra note 11, at 81, 81 n.22.
88. See note 84 supra.
89. 277 F. Supp. at 369 (referring to one proviso in § 187).
90. Id. (referring to 30 U.S.C. § 2266) (1976). See also Kirkpatrick Oil & Gas Co., 15 Inte-
rior Board of Land Appeals 216, 81 Interior Decisions 162 (1974).
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third of the nation's land is public domain land and the bulk of this is
located in the western states. Furthermore, a sustantial percentage of
the nation's mineral resources are contained in the public domain.91
Unsurprisingly, the western states are against federal control over
these lands and resources. The interests of the federal and state gov-
ernments in these lands differ. "To the federal government the energy
issue involves balance of payments, foreign relations, and national se-
curity. To state and local governments, on the other hand, the focus is
pragmatic and localized, the welfare of the state and its citizens being
the primary concern." 92 Whichever government controls these mineral
resources possesses a great interest and a crucial power.
As a result of Ventura, the public domain states have lost the
power which they may have had to regulate mineral development on
the public domain and the individual concerns of the western states
respecting mineral development must yield to the concerns of the na-
tion as a whole.
Scott J Preble
91. See I Public Land Law Review Commission, Energy Fuel Mineral Resources of the Public
Lands, 14 (revised ed. 1970).
92. Mills and Woodson, supra note 1 at 405.
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